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Asian Law and Comparative Legal Studies: A 
Proposed Curriculum Design 
by Chin Kim* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, Asian countries were of little immediate importance to the 
West. Since the Roman era, trade with "East Asia"! has played a significant role 
in the European economy.2 However, only in the last few decades has the direct 
effect of Asian nations on the future of Western Civilization become clear to the 
West. In the aftermath of three wars, the American public has recognized the 
military power of the Asian countries. For example, in 1854, a sizable squadron 
of American warships was able to initiate the opening of Japanese ports against 
the will of Japanese rulers.3 Ninety years later, only fully mobilized American 
might could force Japan to abandon its imperialistic aspirations. In the 
nineteenth century Western gunboats and troops easily could occupy any port in 
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, San Diego, California. LL.B., 1951, Korea 
University; A.B., 1954, Florida Southern College; M.C.L., 1955, George Washington University; 
LL.M., 1956, ].S.D., 1958, Yale University; M.S., 1967, Columbia University. This article is an enlarged 
version of the author's 1978 paper entitled The Teaching of Asian Law, which the author prepared for the 
Festschrift (collection of essays in honor of an individual) under the title of State and Law in East Asia in 
honor of Professor Dr. Karl Bunger. Dr. Bunger jointly conducted the Asian Law Seminar at the 
University of Illinois under the Miller Visiting Professor Program during the academic year 1969-1970. 
The author prepared and delivered this paper for the Comparative Law Colloquium sponsored by the 
Institute of Legal Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) onJuly 30, 1980. The 
Spanish text of this paper will appear in the institute's publication. The author would like to express his 
gratitude to Professor Karl Bunger and Dr. Jorge Carpizo, Director of the Institute of Legal Research, 
of the UNAM, who kindly gave their permission to expand the author's earlier writings in this forum. 
1. The term, "East Asia," which denotes the geographical location of the area, is preferable to "Far 
East," which implies the outdated notion that Europe is the center of the civilized world. 
2. Borp, Das ind"che Spinnhandrad und seine Wanderung nach Ost und West, 3 CIBA-RuNDSCHAU 1096-
1101 (1938); Hedin, Rediscovering the Silk Road, 1 DISCOVERY, N.S. 130-39 (1938); Sarasin, Die Seiden-
strassen von China nach dem romischen Kaiserreich, 1 SINOLOGICA 96 (1948); Stein, Central-Asian Relics of 
China's Ancient Silk Trade, 20 T'OUNG PAO 130-41 (1921); Willetts, TJ.e Silk Road, 2 HIST. TODAY 746-52 
(1952). 
Chinese inventions have made significant contributions to European development. D. Lach, Con-
tributions of China to German Civilization 1646-1740 (1941) (Univ. of Chicago thesis); G. DANTON, THE 
CULTURE CONTACTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: THE EARLIEST SIND-AMERICAN CULTURE CON-
TACTS, 1784-1844 (1931); Shou-i Ch'en, The Influence of China on English Culture During the 
Eighteenth Century (1928) (Univ. of Chicago thesis). 
3. For general background information about this event, see H. BORTON, JAPAN'S MODERN CENTURY 
- FROM PERRY TO 1970 (2d ed. 1970). 
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China, but in the 1950s, the Chinese were able to fight the best American ground 
forces to a bloody stalemate on the Korean peninsula. In 1858, the French army 
easily captured Tourane (Da Nang) but suffered a bitter defeat at Dien Bien Phu 
in 1954.4 Subsequent U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese War demonstrated 
American inability to overcome tough North Vietnamese resilience. Americans 
realized the futility of applying purely military solutions to complex social and 
political problems. 
Westerners also have observed that while the economies of Europe and the 
United States stumble, the economies of the Asia-Pacific region barely have 
broken stride in their pursuit of prosperity. As recession plagued much of the 
West in 1981, most non-communist Asian nations achieved growth rates of 
between three and seven percent. 5 In Hong Kong and Singapore, output in-
creased by ten percent. 6 The Pacific economies contributed more to the increase 
in world production than the United States, Canada and Europe combined. 7 
Due to its heavy export of automobiles, electronics and high-technology equip-
ment, Japan enjoyed a trade surplus of $23 billion in 1981 as compared to just $2 
billion in 1980.8 Many economists predict that the non-communist Asian nations 
will experience similar production gains in 1982.9 
The increasing military, political and economic power of Asia has revealed a 
disquieting fact to Americans: in planning its global strategies, the United States 
no longer can ignore the increasing importance of the nations in the Asia-Pacific 
region. lo A new economic order, based on the principle of interdependency, is 
possible only by changing the largely unilateral role the United States has played 
in the region in the years immediately following World War ILl! Recognizing 
this fact, the United States has moved toward international cooperation. A new 
era of U.S. accommodation with the People's Republic of China already has 
begun,12 and the U.S. search for energy resources in Asia is in progress. 13 
4. See generally, D. LANCASTER, THE EMANCIPATION OF FRENCH INDOChiNA (1961). 





10. Id. These economic gains are impressive hecause Asian nations are heavily dependent on foreign 
markets for their products. Despite the decreased demand for imports in the United States and Europe, 
nlany Asian nations have increased their exports. Economists predict that while the increase in Asian 
exports may abate somewhat, Asian economies will grow at an annual rate of about 6% until 1990. /d. 
II. The Pacific Community Idea: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1979); SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
96TH CONGo 1ST SESS., AN ASIAN-PACIFIC REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: AN EXPLORATORY CON-
CEPT PAPER (Comm. Print 1979) (report authored by Profs. Hugh Patrick and John Drysdale on behalf 
of The Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service). 
12.Id. 
13. Id. 
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But before the West may begin to establish an effective new economic order, 
Westerners must recognize openly that the world society consists of diverse 
political and social systems, each an authentic expression of its own culture. 14 
Once the West begins to understand and accept the merits of these other 
cultures, international discourse can help to alleviate some of the existing ten-
sions and lead to new types of meaningful consensus in today's multicultural 
world. 15 
Westerners should recognize that Asian countries, with their diverse social and 
political institutions, tend to place less emphasis on the importance of law in 
society than do western nations. Although these culturally diverse regions have 
integrated some aspects of western law into their systems, they have not assimi-
lated the western legal culture. 16 For instance, the concept of supremacy of law is 
not prevalent in all Asian societies. 
14. Bodenheimer notes that the term "culture" "is widely understood as a term with axiological 
overtones and value-impregnated connotations." Bodenheimer, Book Review. 25 AM. J. COMPo L. 416, 
419-20 (1977) (reviewing H. W. EHRMANN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES (1976)). Kleinjans discusses 
the concept of culture in the following way: 
Culture is that entire system of patterned behavior, beliefs, values, speech, and general design 
for living that is learned and shared by members of a given society .... Not only is cultural 
behavior a pattern and a part of a whole, but also the particular culture of any group is 
learned; it is not innate .... Within the normal range of individual differences, people's 
anatomical, physiological, and neurological capacities are the same; culture makes them differ-
ent. 
Kleinjans, Reunifying the Koreas - Two Countries, Two Cultures, 1 EAST-WEST PERSPECTIVES 32 (1979). 
15. A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAw IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD 161-186 (1971) [hereinafter cited 
as BOZEMAN]. 
16. [d. at 34-160. See also Bozeman, Law, Culture, and Foreign Policy: East Versus West, 1 ASIAN 
AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN VIEW 106 (1973); WAYS OF THINKING OF EASTERN PEOPLES: INDIA, CHINA, TIBET, 
JAPAN (Nakamura ed. 1964). 
Comparativists are showing an increasing tendency to treat China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam as a 
separate subject area for the purpose of comparative legal studies. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, 
EINFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIFTE DES PRIVATRECHTS, BAND I: GRUNDLAGEN 
419-34 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Zweigert & Katz]; Noda, The Far Eastern Conception of Law, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 120 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Noda]; In order 
to put the question, what is Western law, into a proper perspective, the comparativist, Rene David, 
discusses characteristics of the legal systems of socialist countries and such legal traditions as Moslem, 
Hindu and East Asian. David, Exit-t-il un Droit Occidental?, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND 
CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 56 (1961) [hereinafter cited as David, 
Droit Occidental]. According to Rene David and John Brierly, the laws of the Far East, include those of 
continental Asian countries east of India (China, Outer Mongolia, Korea, Burma and the states of 
Indochina), as well as Japan and Formosa. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE 
WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 440 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 
DAVID & BRIERLEY]. This definition leaves unclear whether Malaya or the Philippines is included. See A 
DIRECTORY OF PERSONS INTERESTED IN ASIAN LAW (C. Kim ed. 1975), which lists persons in the United 
States and non-Asian countries who have shown an active academic or professional interest in East 
Asian law. See also L. Beer, C. Dias, R. Edwards, R. Kidder, D. Lev & B. Metzger, Asian Legal Studies in the 
United States: A Survey Report, 29 J. LEG. ED. 501, 505-25 (1978). 
David and Brierley group legal systems of various countries together into several categories based on 
cultural typology. Zweigert, Zur Lehre von den Rechtskreisen, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND 
CONFLICTS LAW; LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 42 (1961). ZWEIGERT & KOTz,supra note 
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The differences between the legal principles of Asian and western nations is 
not explainable merely in terms of constitutions, statutes or court decisions, but 
one must also consider the different cultural contexts in which those legal 
principles function. For example, although the constitutions of Japan and the 
United States appear to provide many similar guarantees to their respective 
citizens, the courts of these nations apply the guarantees quite differently based 
on the different societal perceptions and goals. 
One important step in promoting international understanding of the diverse 
political, legal and social attitudes of nations in Asia and the West is to offer a 
study in comparative law. This article proposes a curriculum and an approach 
for presenting a seminar in Asian law. A brief overview of a few suggested 
seminar sessions illustrates how an instructor might achieve the objectives of a 
comparative law study. The author proposes that the seminar consist of three 
components: perspective sessions, country sessions and problem sessions. 17 
In this article, the author discusses the perspective portion of the seminar 
dealing with the philosophies, history and usefulness of comparative law. The 
author then illustrates the country sessions component by focusing on the 
constitutional adjudication of cases in Japan and the United States. In this latter 
section, the author compares the Japanese and the U.S. Supreme Courts' ap-
proaches to the issues of justiciability, obscenity, the death penalty, the "right" to 
education, contested elections and freedom of religion. The author incorporated 
an expanded comparative analysis of the Japanese and U.S. Supreme Courts' 
15. David,Introduction to 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3-13 (1972); DAVID & 
BRIERLEY, supra. McAleavy, Chinese Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEM 105-29 (j. Derrett ed. 
1968) [hereinafter cited as McAleavy]. Schlesinger explores the similarities between various legal 
systems' approaches to the law of obligations, especially of contracts, that transcend the various Kultur-
kreis (cultural spheres). Schlesinger, The Common Core of Legal Systems: An Emerging Subject o[Comparative 
Study, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. 
YNTEMA 65 (1961). John Merryman observes: "The law is rooted in the culture, and it responds, within 
cultural limits, to the specific demands of a given society in a given time and place. It is, at bottom, a 
historically determined process formulated, and resolved. Substitution of one legal tradition for an-
other is neither possible nor desirable." J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 157 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MERRYMAN]. 
17. In order to present and discuss the relevant material in reasonable depth, the seminar should 
consist of approximately fifteen two-hour sessions. In an Asian law seminar "perspective" sessions 
(sessions 1-2) should cover Asian law in perspective. "Country" sessions (sessions 3-7) should focus on 
the following topics: law in traditional China, law in contemporary Japan, the subsequent evolution and 
reception of Anglo-American law in contemporary Japan, a comparative analysis of constitutional 
adjudication in Japan and the United States and law in Korea and Vietnam. The remaining "Problem" 
sessions (sessions 8-15) should be devoted to discussing student research on the following topics: family 
law in contemporary Asian countries, the codification of conflict of law rules in Japan (1898) and its 
radiations in China, Korea and Thailand, labor law in Asia, trading with Asian countries, compensation 
for traffic victims in Asian countries, land reform, environmental planning, nationality law and popula-
tion control in Asian countries, and the legal profession in Asian countries. The instructor, of course, 
may vary the emphasis given to the problem sessions due to the different interests of seminar partici-
pants. The author prepared this seminar schedule for the academic year 1977-78 at the University of 
Illinois College of Law. 
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treatment of these six constitutional issues into a comparative law course which 
the author taught a~ California Western School of Law during the academic year 
1978-79. 
II. GENERAL SEMINAR DESIGN 
In outlining the seminar, the author has identified those principles of East 
Asian law which will best provide students with insight into the legal traditions of 
East Asia. The author, therefore, has focused the curriculum on three areas. 
First, the curriculum offers a survey of traditional Chinese legal cuiture I8 and its 
formal written expression in a series of dynastic imperial codes. Here, the 
curriculum presents a study of these codes' influence on the legal systems of 
Japan,I9 Korea 20 and Vietnam. 21 In presenting this area, the instructor should 
concentrate on an analysis of the social structures of the four countries, with 
particular reference to the mechanics and modalities of dispute resolution. 
Second, the curriculum includes an assessment of the impact of Franco-German 
and Anglo-American legal traditions on China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam 
throughout their modern histories. Finally, the curriculum imparts an under-
standing of the characteristics of the Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese versions 
of socialist legality based on Marxism and Leninism. 
III. PERSPECTIVE SESSIONS 
The first two perspective sessions should be introductory and provide students 
with a background in the philosophies of comparative law. This background is 
necessary for meaningful participation in the seminar. Students will gain a 
perspective on the operation of their own legal system through an examination 
of legal concepts and techniques which are different from their own. 22 
18. For a bibliographical guide to Chinese legal history, see E. Balazs & M. Engelborghs-Bertels, 
China, in BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL HISTORY AND ETHNOLOGY, § 14 (J. Gilissen ed. 
1972). 
19. For a useful guide and bibliography to Japanese legal history. see Ishii,Japan, in BIBLIOGRAPHICAL 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL HISTORY AND ETHNOLOGY, § 13 O. Gilissen. ed. 1964). 
20. Kim, Korea, in BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL HISTORY AND ETHNOLOGY, § 12 
(J. Gilissen, ed. 1970). 
21. Bongert,lruiochina, in BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL HISTORY AND ETHNOLOGY, § II 
O. Gilissen, ed. 1967). NGUYEN I'HuONG-KHANH, VIETNAMESE LEGAL MATERIALS 1954-1975: A SELECTED 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 54-56 (1977) (lists publications dealing with Vietnamese legal history). 
22. While thrusting students into the consideration of legal issues within a foreign legal system may 
not be productive without preparing those students with respect to that country's legal and administra-
tive institutions,judicial process and court structure, students can acquire an adequate background with 
the aid of a comprehensive outside reading list. The author prepared the following list in light of legal 
materials available in English as of May. 1980: J. WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL 
SYSTEMS (1928); S. VESSEy-FITZGERALD, THE FUTURE OF ORIENTAL LEGAL STUDIES (1948); J. ANDERSON, 
THE RELEVANCE OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN LEGAL STUDIES (1954); Noda, supra note 16. I K. ZWEIGERT 
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The perspective sessions should achieve two major objectives: they should 
discuss the meaning of "legal system" and introduce the philosophies behind the 
study of comparative law. 
A. Discussion of "Legal System" 
First, class discussion centers on the definition of "legal system." Students can 
be encouraged to offer their own definitions, as well as to comment on the 
definitions formulated by Wigmore23 and other writers. 24 In conjunction with 
class discussion, the instructor might illustrate the shortcomings of Wigmore's 
historical jurisprudential approach in light of analytical, sociological jurispru-
dences and legal realism. The instructor should enable the participants to 
realize, however, that Wigmore's survey of different legal systems lacks an 
accurate description of how a legal system functions in a societal setting. In his 
analysis, Wigmore fails to discuss the interrelationship of law and culture. 
B. Lecture on Comparative Law 
In the next section of the course, the curriculum concentrates on enabling 
students to understand the East Asian legal system and its particular relationship 
to comparative law study. This portion of the course is primarily lecture-
oriented, with a concentration on the definition of comparative law. 
The curriculum first outlines the objective of comparative study, which is to 
impart an awareness that one nation's institutions, laws, and methods are not the 
only possible - or necessarily the best - in the world. 25 The lectures can be 
& H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 352-65 (1977); DAVID S. BRIERLEY, supra note 16, 
at 477-504. McAleavy,supra note 16. T'uNG-Tsu CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1965); 
V. LI. LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES (1978); 
NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW (1976); Kim & Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The 
Traditional Japanese Conception of Law. 28 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 491 (1979); Kawashima, The Status of the 
Individual in the Notion of Law, Right and Social Order, in THE JAPANESE MIND ESSENTIALS OF JAPANESE 
PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 262-87 U. Moore ed. 1967); D. MITCHELL, AMAERU: THE EXPRESSION OF 
RECIPROCAL DEPENDENCY NEEDS IN JAPANESE POLITICS AND LAW (1976); Kim, Legal Systems, in STUDIES 
ON KOREA: A SCHOLAR'S GurDE 338-57 (1980); M. HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF SOUTH-EAST 
ASIA 1-2,6,40,73-94, 186 (1978). 
23. J. WIGMORE, A WORLD MAP OF PRESENT DAY LEGAL SYSTEMS at 1133-1146 [hereinafter cited as 
WIGMORE]' Of the sixteen systems discussed in Wigmore's work, only eight had survived by 1928 and, of 
the eight, Wigmore had considered only four to be pure systems at that time. Wigmore characterizes 
each of the various legal systems in three categories: pure, blended and composite. !d. 
24. According to Wigmore, a legal system is a body of rules having a life of its own, as a part of some 
political system. Legal systems react upon themselves and tend to develop individual details. See id. at 
1119-30. See generally Wortley, On Re-reading Dean Wigmore's Panorama of the World's Legal Systems, 2 
PROBLEMES CONTEMPORAINS DE DROIT COMPARE 535 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Wortley]; Raz, The 
Identity of Legal Systems, 59 CALlF. L. REV. 795 (1971). 
25. Comparative legal science teaches us how nations having a common origin may develop 
independently their original inheritance of legal ideas, and on the other hand how the legal 
systems of nations having no association in history may advance along common lines of 
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designed to give students critical insights into the role of law in society through 
an understanding of the different laws, policies and institutions that meet com-
mon problems in other countries. 26 In addition, students should consider the 
differences between the legal reasoning and arguments of foreign lawyers and 
those of American lawyers. Such consideration helps the student to understand 
that the study of comparative law may enable him to improve his own legal 
system because of insights gained into the mechanics of that system and because 
of the realization that replacing one approach to particular problems with 
superior foreign solutions may be possible. 
The teaching of legal history and legal philosophy has added a new dimension 
to the traditional analysis of legal problems. 27 At present, with the law coming 
under constant pressure to adapt to rapid social and economic change, and with 
the underlying assumptions of the American system being challenged, a need for 
new and alternative solutions to social problems exists. Comparative law is a 
source of such solutions. 2R 
The curriculum, therefore, devotes some attention to the manner in which 
various writers and philosophers have viewed the nature of comparative law as 
an approach to comparing legal systems and laws. For example, in discussing the 
meaning of "functional comparison," Pound explained that comparative study is 
concerned with determining how the same problem may be met by one legal 
institution or doctrine in one system oflaw and by a quite different institution or 
doctrine in another. 2H 
development. Investigations carried on in the region of a single system serve to smooth the 
path for the advent of comparative legal science. 
]. WIGMORE. LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN 7 (1969). 
26. The instructor may wish to elaborate on the following statement: 
As the nations are drawn closer together by forces not wholly in human control. it is inevitable 
that they should come to know each other more fully. The legal institutions of any country are 
no less significant than its language. political ideas. and social organization. The two great legal 
systems of the world. the civil and common law. have for some years been moving toward what 
may become. in various fields of law. a common ground. 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTEREST: SELECTED WRITINGS OF MAX RUMELII< AI<D OTHERS at ix (M. Schoch 
trans. & ed. 1948). 
27. Ault & Glendon. The Importance of Comparative Law in Legal Education: United Statrs GoaL, and 
Methods of Legal Comparison 27]. LEG. ED. 599. 600 (1976). 
28. Id. 
29. R. Pound. What May We Expect From Comparative Law? 22 A.B.A.]. 56. 60 (1936). Pound explains 
the meaning of "functional comparison": 
The functional approach in every connection is characteristic of the present day science of 
law. But when any term gets into vogue. there is danger of using it perfunctorily, with no 
critical attention to its meaning in a particular context. It will be inferred at once that I think of 
a comparison of legal precepts with respect to how and how far they attain their ends and the 
ends of law in the time and place. The workings of legal precepts are now looked into as much 
as or more than their abstract content. But what I have in mind particularly is study of how the 
same thing may be brought about. the same problem may be met by one legal institution or 
doctrine or precept in one body of law and by another and quite different institution or 
doctrine or precept in another. 
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Rheinstein, as well, described the "functional comparison of legal rules and 
institutions" as being conducted "for the purpose of better understanding the 
functions fulfilled by the rules and institutions of one's own law by looking at 
them through the mirror of corresponding foreign institutions."3o 
An instructor may wish to point out that Rene David3! was a forerunner in 
advocating comparative law as a scientific approach to the study of legal systems. 
According to this view, the student of comparative law should acquire a knowl-
edge of a country's political, social and economic structure in order to under-
stand the sources of that nation's law and the function of its jurists. 32 The task of 
comparing domestic and foreign laws must proceed beyond the stage of examin-
ing mere written texts of law. 33 
David warns westerners against superimposing their convictions of the philo-
sophical soundness of the western style of democracy, their methods of reason-
/d. at 59. See also Pound, The Revival of Comparative Law, 5 TuL. L. REV. I (1930); Pound, The Passing of 
Main-Streetism, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
HESSEL E. YNTEMA 7 (1961). 
30. Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REv. 615, 619 (1937-1938). The comparative 
method is useful for the study of what Rheinstein characterizes as the "sociology of law" for the purpose 
of determining the role played by law in human society in general. Comparative study also clarifies the 
methods which society has employed in various times and places for achieving desired ends of law. Id. 
According to Rheinstein, comparative law, employed in functional comparison, may be a tool for the 
practicing attorney by providing him with insights, ideas and arguments which he is unlikely to obtain 
by merely looking at the structure of his own law. Id. at 618. 
31. David maintains that the observation of historical and sociological conditions of legal systems 
leads many to believe that comparative law is a method of veritable science. R. DAVID, TRAITE ELEMEN-
T AIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARE 3-5 ( 1950) [hereinafter cited as DAVID, TRAITE ELEMENT AIRE]; R. DAVID, 
LEs GRANDS SYSTEMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS (DROIT COMPARE) 14-16 (3rd ed. 1969). See also David, 
Existe-t-il un Droit Occidental?, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 56 (1961). 
32. R. DAVID, TRAITE ELEMENTAIREsupra note 31, at 3, 8, 9-10,12,17 (1950). 
33. According to Harold Gutteridge, "the law must be examined in the light of their political, social 
or economic purpose, and regard must be paid to their dynamic rather than their static or doctrinal 
aspects." H. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAw: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE METHOD OF 
LEGAL STUDY AND RESEARCH 174 (2d ed. 1949). In Germany, one author has noted the existence of a 
gap between written law and law in actuality: "Section 239 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 
adopted in imitation of Anglo-American procedure, permits the lawyers for prosecution and defense to 
agree that they, rather than the presiding judge, shall examine the witnesses at trial. This provision has 
been dead letter from the moment of its enactment .... " J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: GERMANY 2 (1977). 
Kahn-Freund stresses Gutteridge's point in more forceful words: 
[u]se [of the comparative method] requires a knowledge, not only of the foreign law, but also of 
its social, and above all, its political context. The use of comparative law for practical purposes 
becomes an abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which ignores this context of the 
law. I am appealing to those who teach comparative law to be aware of this risk and to transmit 
that awareness to their students among whom there may be those called upon to promote the 
exchange of legal ideas in the processes of legislation. 
Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1,27 (1974). Law, according to the 
Gutteridge and Kahn-Freund thesis, is a socio-cultural phenomenon. Thus, a person examining foreign 
laws should obtain an informed perspective of the socio-politico economic motivations functioning in 
the countries concerned. 
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ing, and their moral and religious conceptions on the non-western nations of the 
world. 34 With this in mind, the instructor should emphasize that the study of 
comparative law is meaningful only when the student views legal systems as a 
function of the societal goals and attitudes that give law its effectiveness.35 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION OF CASES IN JAPAN AND THE 
UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The following discussion of a comparative analysis of Japanese and U.S. 
constitutional adjudications illustrates how an instructor might achieve the 
above-mentioned objectives of the comparative law curriculum. The purpose of 
this seminar is to acquaint students with judicial analysis of the Japanese and U.S. 
Constitutions. 36 In order to properly analyze the selected Japanese Supreme 
34. David, Deux Conceptions de I'Ordre Social, in 1 Ius PRIVATUM GENTIUM 53 (1969). 
35. The legal culture is the network of values and people's attitudes relating to law and practices. 
Such concepts as sociology of law or living law may be useful in clarifying elements of legal culture. The 
student should consider and question the cultural elements of a developed legal system. This should 
include: 
the values and attitudes which bind the system together, and which determine the place of 
the legal system in the culture of the society as a whole. What kind of training and habits do 
lawyers andjudges have? What do people think of law? Do groups or individuals willingly go to 
court? For what purposes do people turn to lawyers; for what purposes do they make use of 
other officials and intermediaries? Is there respect for law, government and tradition? What is 
the relationship between class structure and the use or non-use of legal institutions? What 
informal social controls exist in addition to or in place of formal ones? Who prefers which kind 
of controls, and why? 
Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAW & SOC'y REV. 29, 34 (1969). Various factors such 
as beliefs and attitudes, condition the concept of legal culture and influence the way in which legal 
culture functions. Merryman uses the concept of legal tradition which he describes as: 
A set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role 
of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal 
system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught. 
The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. 
MERRYMAN, supra note 16, at 2. 
Merryman observes that "legal culture" encompasses those "historically conditioned, deeply rooted 
attitudes about the nature of law and about the proper structure and operation of a legal system that are 
at large in the society," J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 28 (1968). According to another commentator, legal culture means "the 
generalized set of lay and professional values and attitudes towards law and the role of the legal process 
in s<,>ciety. It is this complex of values and attitudes that largely determines which aspects of the formal 
legal structure work and which do not." K. KARST & R. RESENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN 
AMERICA 57-58 (1975). 
36. English translations of 32 Japanese Supreme Court decisions are available for consultation in 
H. ITOH & L. BEER, CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAw OF JAPAN (1978) [hereinafter cited as iTOH & BEER]. 
Many legal reforms in Japan followed the end of World War II. For a discussion of these reforms, see 
LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (A. von Mehren ed. 1963); A. OPPLER, LEGAL 
REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN (1976). The adoption of the separation of powers doctrine was one of the 
most innovative reforms under the 1947 Constitution. This reform established the independent 
judiciary and abolished the old constitutional principle under which courts were subservient to the 
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Court decisions, students must have sufficient background insight into the orga-
nization and function of the judicial system in Japan. Students can acquire this 
background by reading several articles which address these issues. 37 After read-
ing these assigned materials, students should then read several Japanese Su-
preme Court decisions:lH and compare them to American Supreme Court de-
cisions on the same issue. 
A. justiciability and Political Questions 
The concepts of justiciability and political questions present good subject 
matters for comparison, since these concepts are fundamental legal principles 
which the courts of both the United States and Japan have addressed. In order to 
facilitate a meaningful analysis, the instructor should ensure that students 
thoroughly understand these concepts before comparing the Japanese and 
American approaches to justiciability and political questions. 
I. American Approach 
Baker v. Carr 39 provides an important foundation for a discussion ofjusticiabil-
ity in the comparative law context. In this well-known case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a suit by voters to force reapportionment of the legislature did 
not involve a nonjusticiable political question. Justice Brennan's discussion of the 
political question doctrine clearly defined the American approach to justiciability 
of issues. 
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Brennan stated that in determining 
whether a question falls within the political question category and is, therefore, 
nonjusticiable, "dominant consideration is given to the existence of satisfactory 
criteria for a judicial solution as well as to the appropriateness of attributing 
Emperor. H. ITOH, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 2-37, 110-123 
(1906). Article 81 of the 1947 Constitution states: "The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with 
power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act." J. MAKI, COUR'! 
AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60421 (1964) [hereinafter 
cited as MAKI] (this book offers selected translations of major Japanese Supreme Court cases and 
constitutional provisions). 
37. Nathanson, Constitutional Adjudication in japan, 7 AM. J. COMPo L. 195 (1958); !toh, judicial 
Decision Making in the japanese Supreme Court, 3 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 128 (1969); Danelski, The 
People and the Court injapan, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 45-72 (1969); Itoh,How judges Think in 
japan, 18 AM. J. COMPo L. 775 (1970). See also MAKI, supra note 36. THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS 
FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67 (D. Henderson ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN]. 
38. The Supreme Court of Japan exercises broad powers of control in Japanese jurisprudence. !t is 
not only the court of last resort with the power of constitutional review, but it also administers the entire 
judiciary. The Supreme Court is responsible for training all members of the legal profession and 
possesses the power to determine rules and trial procedures. MAKI, supra note 36, at XV. 
39. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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finality to the action of the political branches of the United States Govern-
ment."40 
According to Justice Brennan, the nonjusticiability of political questions is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers inherent in the U.S. system of 
government. Therefore, a case-by-case analysis is necessary.41 The opinion em-
phasized that the determination of whether an issue has been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that 
branch exceeds its authority, is a "delicate exercise of constitutional interpreta-
tion and is a responsibility of [the Supreme Court] as ultimate interpretor of 
the Constitution."42 
Justice Brennan also reviewed the justiciability of foreign relations issues, an 
area usually reserved for the executive or legislative branches of government: 
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touch-
ing foreign relations are political questions. Not only does resolution 
of such issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial applica-
tion, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed 
to the executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely 
demand single-voiced statement of the government's views. Yet it is 
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field 
seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular 
question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the 
political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light 
of its nature and posture in the specific cases, and of the possible 
consequences of judicial action.43 
40. Id. at 210. See aiso, Coleman v. Miller. 307 U.S. 433 (1938). 
41. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210. 
42.Id.at211. 
43. !d. Other scholars doubt the existence of the "political question" doctrine. Some have suggested 
that the political question doctrine is simply another device by which the Supreme Court avoids issues it 
does not wish to decide. Scharp, Judicial Review and tlu! Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE 
L.J. 517 (1966). Professor Scharp analyzed the cases and concluded: 
The Court has available such a wide variety of procedural and substantive devices for not 
deciding, and it is in fact decided such a long list of explosive issues, that it appears rather 
un persuasive to explain the political question doctrine purely in terms of an opportunistic 
retreat from "prickly" cases or issues. 
!d. at 566. 
Professor Henkin suggests that the separate political question doctrine does not exist. 
[T]here may be no doctrine requiring abstention from judicial review of 'political questions.' 
The cases which are supposed to have established the political question doctrine required no 
such extraordinary abstention from judicial review; they called only for the ordinary respect by 
the courts for the political domain. Having reviewed, the Court refused to invalidate the 
challenged actions because they were within the constitutional authority of the President or 
Congress. In no case did the Court have to use the phrase 'political question' 
Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597,600 (1976). 
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The opinion explained that a court will not ordinarily inquire into whether a 
treaty has been terminated because governmental action is of "controlling im-
portance on such questions."44 If, however, the government has taken no conclu-
sive action, a court may construe a treaty and find that it provides the answer. 45 
The opinion also noted that, although a court will not construe a treaty in a 
manner inconsistent with a subsequent federal statute, a court will not be so 
reluctant if the treaty conflicts with state law. 46 
Mora v. McNamara also offers important insight into the justiciability issue 
under U.S. law.47 In this case, two dissenting Supreme Court justices argued that 
the Court should consider the issue of American involvement in Vietnam.48 
Justice Stewart, one of the dissenters, would have had the Court decide a 
number of "large and deeply troubling questions" that the majority refused to 
find were within the decision-making domain of the Court. 49 
F or courts in the United States, the justiciability of domestic issues is inextrica-
bly linked to the fundamental principle of separation of powers as outlined in 
the U.S. Constitution. 50 The concept of separation of powers is also integral to 
justiciability of foreign relations issues, where the concept embodies the necessity 
for the United States to speak to the world with one vOice. 
2. Japanese Approach 
The Japanese Supreme Court considered the issue of justiciability of foreign 
relations questions in Sunakawa v. Japan. 51 Sunakawa is the only Supreme Court 
44. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 212. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. 389 U.S. 934 (1967). 
48. The dissenting justices wanted the Court to determine whether Congress was constitutionally 
empowered to playa more active role in the initiation and conduct of war. [d. at 936. The dissent stated 
that while the President might have to take emergency action to protect U.S. security, ifhe were going to 
use U.S. armed forces in another manner, Congress must act as a check on such Executive action. [d. 
According to the dissent, a declaration of war would not correctly reflect the very limited objectives of 
the United States with respect to Vietnam. [d. 
49. Several questions that Justice Stewart would have decided were: 
(I) Is the present United States military activity in Vietnam a 'war' within the meaning of 
Article I, Section 8, Clause II, of the Constitution? 
(2) If so, may the Executive constitutionally order the petitioners to participate in that military 
activity, when no war has been declared by the Congress? 
(3) Of what relevance to Question [2] are the present treaty obligations of the United States? 
(4) Of what relevance to Question [2] is the joint Congressional (,Tonkin Bay') Resolution of 
August 10, 1964? 
(a) Do present United States military operations fall within the terms of Joint Resolution? 
(b) If the Joint Resolution purports to give the Chief Executive authority to commit 
Gnited States forces to armed conflict limited in scope only by his own absolute discretion, 
is the Resolution a constitutionally impermissible delegation of all or part of Congress' 
power to declare war? 
Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. at 935. 
50. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210. 
51. For a discussion of the Sunakawa case, see MAKI supra note 36, at 298-361; Yokota, Political 
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decision directly interpreting the meaning of Article 9, the Renunciation of War 
clause, which is the most controversial article in the Japanese Constitution. 52 The 
issues raised in Sunakawa were the constitutionality of the U.S. military bases in 
Japan53 and the legal standing of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which 
was an administrative agreement signed without the express sanction of the 
Japanese legislature. 54 
Because of the far-reaching political, legal, diplomatic and military implica-
tions of the case, the Japanese Supreme Court took almost seven months to 
render its decision55 upholding the legality of the U.S. military presence in 
Japan. The Court held that Article 9 did not deny the right of self-defense to 
Japan. Further, the court defined the term "war potential" used in paragraph 
two of the Article to mean the war potential under the command and control of 
Japan rather than the war potential of foreign armed forces. Although the 
decision in Sunakawa was unanimous, no fewer than ten justices wrote supple-
mentary opinions. A significant area of disagreement among the justices con-
cerned the court's right to review treaties and other acts of the government. 
In one supplementary opinion, Justices Fujita Hachiro and Iriye Toshio dis-
cussed how the Japanese Constitution establishes the separation of powers -
legislative, executive, and judicial - in the Japanese government. They stated 
Questions and Judicial Review: A Comparison. in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 141-66 (Henderson ed. 
1969). 
52. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order. the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a 
means of settling international disputes. 
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph. land, sea, and air forces, as well 
as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not 
be recognized. 
MAKI, supra note 36, at 413. 
53. The Sunakawa Incident occurred at Tachikawa air base, a major U.S. installation close to Tokyo, 
on July 8,1957. Earlier, Japanese and American authorities had agreed to extend a base runway. Local 
citizens objected to the extension and confronted the surveyors when they arrived. The confrontation 
developed into a riot during which some protestors trespassed on the base. Although the trespassers 
neither damaged U.S. equipment nor injured American personnel, the Japanese police arrested the 
trespassers for illegal entry. MAKI, supra note 36, at 298-299. 
The Tokyo District Court found the protestors not guilty because they had been charged under the 
Special Criminal Law, which, the court stated, had been illegally enacted in the implementation of the 
Japan-United States Security Treaty of 1951, under which the United States was to protect Japan from 
aggression. The court declared this Treaty unconstitutional because the treaty provided for the 
stationing of U.S. forces inJapan.ld. at 299. The court found that those forces constituted war potential 
- the maintenance of which was forbidden by Article 9. Therefore, the court reasoned, finding the 
defendants guilty would contravene Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution which provides that no 
person shall suffer a criminal penalty "except according to procedure established by law." Id. 
54. With respect to the subject of an administrative agreement signed without the sanction .of the 
legislature, students may compare the Japanesejudicial position with the views of other nations. See, e.g., 
W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS (1971); H. BRIGGS, THE LAw OF NATIONS (2nd 
ed. 1952). 
'55, MAKI, supra note 36, at 299, 
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that the courts have the power to review all legislative and executive acts to the 
extent that the acts involve legal disputes. This recognition of judicial supremacy 
over the legislative and executive branches is a special characteristic of the 
Japanese Constitution. However, all justices agreed that a limit to the supremacy 
of this judicial power does exist. 
The Court viewed the Security Treaty, under which the United States pro-
vided military protection to Japan, as having an important relation to the secu-
rity and peace of Japan as a sovereign nation. Because both the House of 
Representatives and House of Councillors had carefully considered the Treaty 
and its constitutionality, the Supreme Court refused to review the legality of the 
Treaty. 
3. Comparative Analysis 
The courts of Japan and the United States have treated the issue of justiciabil-
ity in a similar manner. According to the Supreme Courts of both nations, acts of 
state which have a primarily political nature are beyond the limitations of a 
court's power of review. Accordingly, the courts must leave these decisions to the 
political bodies that are directly responsible to the citizens. 
In addition, as the decisions in Baker v. Carr and Sunakawa v. japan demon-
strate, when either American or Japanese courts are faced with foreign policy 
questions such as treaties or trade policies, their right of constitutional review is 
strictly limited unless the governmental act is clearly and obviously unconstitu-
tional and invalid. As in the United States, the limitation on the judicial review 
power of Japanese courts is primarily rooted in the concept of separation of 
powers, as outlined in the Constitutions of both nations. 
However, as indicated in Mora. v. McNamara, some American justices would 
like the lJ .S. Supreme Court to expand its "checks and balances" role into the 
political question area when a question arises as to whether the executive branch 
of the government has overstepped its authority by authorizing military acts in 
the absence of a Declaration of War by Congress. 
B. Rulings on Obscenity 
An examination of the rulings on obscenity and freedom of expression in the 
United States and Japan provides a second useful basis for a comparative 
analysis of the two legal systems. As an introduction to the issue, students may 
find a comparison of the U.S. Supreme Court cases, Roth v. United States, 56 
Ginsberg v. New York,57 and Miller v. California,58 and the Japanese Supreme 
56. 354 u.s. 476 (1957). 
57. 390 u.s. 629 (1967). 
58. 413 C.S. 15 (1973). 
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Court case, Koyama v. State59 to be helpful. For additional insight, students should 
compare Article 175 of the Japanese Criminal Code,60 which codifies the 
Japanese obscenity law, with the American Law Institute Model Penal Code6! 
concerning the same subject. 
1. American Approach 
In the landmark decision of Miller v. California,62 the U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed previous rulings63 that the first amendment does not protect the 
distribution of obscene materials,64 and enunciated a new three-pronged test for 
judging obscenity: 
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest in sex; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in 
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
59. Decision of Mar. 13, 1952, 11 Sai-han Keishu 997 (Grand Bench). For a discussion of the Lady 
Chatterley's Lover decision, see MARl, supra note 36, at 3-37. 
60. THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: A PREPARATORY DRAFT FOR THE REVISED PENAL 
CODE OF JAPAN (B. George Jr. ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT PENAL CODE]. 
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This proposed Code would regulate 
the distribution and sale of obscene material as follows: 
/d. 
Dissemination Prohibited. Except as provided in subsection (4), a person who disseminates 
obscenity commits a misdemeanor. ... A person disseminates obscenity if he (a) sells, delivers 
or provides, or offers or agrees to sell, deliver or provide any obscene writing, picture record, 
or other representation or embodiment obscene; or (b) presents or directs an obscene play, 
dance or other performance or participates directly in that portion thereof which makes it 
obscene; or (c) publishes, exhibits or otherwise makes available anything obscene .... 
(2) Obscene Defined, Method of Adjudication. A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its 
predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or 
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or 
representation of such matters. A thing is obscene even if the obscenity is latent, as in the case 
of undeveloped photographs. Obscenity shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults 
except that it shall be judged with reference to children or other specially susceptible audience 
if it appears from the character of the material or circumstance of its dissemination to be 
specially designed for or directed to such an audience .... 
62. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This case involves the application of a state's criminal obscenity statute to a 
situation in which sexually explicit materials have been sent through the mail to recipients who had not 
indicated a desire to receive them. 
63. United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts. 383 
U.S. 413 (1966). For a discussion of other obscenity cases, see Kim, Constitution and Obscenity: japan and 
the USA, 23 AM. J. COMPo L. 255, 270-77 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kim. Constitution and Obscenity]. 
64. The Supreme Court has stated that the first amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, 
have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a 
majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent. Roth V. U.S., 354 U.S. at 484; Miller 
V. California. 413 U.S. at 34. "The protection given to speech and press was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people. But the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing 
commercial gain, is a different matter." [d. See Kois V. Wisconsin. 408 U.S. 229 (1972); Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
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applicable state law;65 and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 66 
The Court further stated that no one can be prosecuted for the sale or exposure 
of obscene materials unless the materials depict or describe patently offensive 
"hard core" sexual conduct as specifically defined by the regulating state law, as 
written or construed.67 
In Miller, the Court was also concerned with ascertaining which forms of 
expression may be regarded as "speech" within the purview of the first amend-
ment. In this regard, the Court allows state courts to use a variable obscenity 
standard as opposed to a national standard. This variable test allows the defini-
tion of speech to accommodate varying judgments about the work's social impact 
in different communities. 68 Under this test, the Court will consider the artistic 
and intellectual value of the work and will give considerable weight to the value 
of freedom of speech. This approach guards against the infringement of the 
fundamental right of free speech. 
2. Japanese Approach 
In Ishii et al v. japan, 69 the prosecution charged the defendants with obscenity 
in connection with the translation and publication of Histaire de juliette, au les 
Prosperites du Vice by the Marquis de Sade. The indictment charged that fourteen 
passages in the second of two volumes were obscene. 7o 
The Tokyo District Court ruled that under Article 175 of the Japanese Penal 
Code, a writing was obscene and the author could be prosecuted only if the 
writing contained three elements; first, the writing had to unnecessarily excite or 
stimulate sexual desire; second, the writing had to offend the normal sense of 
embarrassment; and, third, the substance of the writing had to go beyond 
accepted moral concepts regarding sex. The Tokyo High Court71 ruled that the 
fourteen passages in question were obscene because they sufficiently met the test 
65. The Court gave a few "plain examples" of what a state statute could define for regulation under 
subsection (b) of the standard announced in Miller: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descrip-
tions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; (b) Patently offensive representa-
tions or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. 
at 25. 
66. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24 (1973). 
67. [d. at 27. 
68. Id. at 31. 
69. This case is discussed in hOH & BEER, supra note 36, at 183-217. 
70. The original work, a literary and ideological novel, criticized the Christian civilization and 
advocated elimination of the existing moral, religious and social order. Hanrei Taimuzu 96, No. 240 of 
1969. 
71. The High Court is onc of four courts beneath the Japanese Supreme Court. The other three 
courts are the District Court, Family Court and Summary Court. 
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of unnecessarily exciting or stimulating sexual desire, although the court ac-
knowledged that the work was not pornography. 
The Japanese Supreme Court affirmed the Tokyo High Court's decision and 
reiterated two rulings in Koyama v. State. 72 First, the Court stated, a particular 
work may be literary and ideological, but if it also is obscene, its author is not 
immune from criminal prosecution. Second, a defendant may not invoke the 
principles of Articles 21 73 and 23 74 of the Constitution to escape the obligations of 
the public welfare concept with respect to the issue of obscenity. 
The Court ruled that the protection of a sexual code and the maintenance of a 
minimum sexual morality are part of the public welfare. Under this theory, the 
law will not excuse the obscene nature of a composition even if the work has high 
artistic merit. The Court stated that the courts must guard society against moral 
degeneration in accordance with the norms of the prevailing social ideas. They 
added that neither the courts nor the laws must necessarily affirm social realities; 
rather, the courts must confront evil and corruption with a critical attitude and 
must play an active role in determining obscenity standards. 
However, for the first time, the Court clearly ruled that the courts should not 
consider the obscenity of a particular passage separately, but instead should 
judge such obscenity within the context of the work as a whole. The Court also 
recognized that prevailing public perceptions regarding sex and obscenity 
gradually change and that the Court would note these changes as they occur. 
3. Comparative Analysis 
The Ishii case demonstrates that, in adjudicating obscenity cases,75 the 
Japanese Supreme Court has the propensity to act as the guardian of public 
morality by applying its own interpretation of "public welfare."76 The Japanese 
Supreme Court has formulated its own definition of obscenity and decides cases 
with reference to that independent definition. 
Although the Court applies a balancing test in obscenity cases, the balance 
favors public morality over free speech of the individual; therefore, Japanese 
72. Decision of Mar. 13. 1952, II Sai-han Keishu 997 (Grand Bench). For a discussion of the Koyama 
case, see Kim, Constitution and Obscenity, supra note 63, at 257-62. 
73. Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution states: "Freedom of assembly and association as well as 
speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed .... 
"No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be 
violated." MAKI, supra note 36, at 414. 
74. Article 23 of the Japanese Constitution states: "Academic freedom shall be guaranteed." Id. 
75. The Japanese Supreme Court has used three tests in deciding the obscenity cases: the public 
welfare standard, the "prevailing ideas of society" standard, and the "art-obscenity two dimensional" 
standard. For a discussion of these standards,see Kim. Constitution and Obscenity, supra note 63, at 277-82. 
76. In the Ishii case. the Japanese Supreme Court was concerned primarily with public welfare 
considerations. The Court, in fact. gave no indication that it will give preference to an individual's right 
to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution. 
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government regulations on obscenity have been more easily upheld 77 than 
American regulations. 
The student should note that the balancing test used in Japan lends itself to a 
considerable amount of subjectivity. The Ishii majority appeared to substitute its 
own "proper concept of sexual morality" for the prevailing ideas of the commu-
nity. Acting in conformity with its "guardian" function, the Japanese Supreme 
Court found no error when the lower court rendered its decision without 
determining the effects the work might have on the average person. 
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court does not regard its role as that of 
guardian of the public morality, and allows an infringement of the fundamental 
right of freedom of speech only where a compelling state interest can be shown. 
Therefore, in the United States, the burden of proof lies with the government, 
while in Japan, the burden of prooflies with the individual claiming to have been 
aggrieved. 78 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court will not set its own indepen-
dent standards of obscenity and has emphasized that the Court's function does 
not include proposing regulatory schemes for the states. 79 Obscenity in the 
United States is both a question of fact and a question of law. The Court in Miller 
held that the issue of whether a work is obscene is a question of fact for the jury. 
However, in Jenkins v. Georgia,80 the Court held that judges should not give 
jurors unbridled discretion to determine what is "patently offensive." American 
appellate courts will conduct an independent review of constitutional claims 
where necessary to guarantee that the materials in question depict or describe 
patently offensive "hard-core" sexual conduct. 81 Japanese appellate courts will 
not conduct such an independent review unless the facts of the case are in 
dispute. 
Also, in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller, the Japanese 
Supreme Court will not consider the artistic and intellectual value of a work in 
determining whether the work is obscene. Under the Japanese standard, a work 
is classified more easily as "obscene" because artistic and intellectual values are 
not independent considerations, and individual fundamental rights have no 
greater preference than public welfare interests. A perusal of U.S. decisions 
indicates a greater reluctance to sacrifice an individual's freedom of expression 
77. In the United States, courts have historically held that "obscenity" is not "speech" and hence is not 
within the purview of first amendment rights. In defining obscenity, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
engaged in a variety of approaches, which generally indicate an unwillingness to sacrifice first amend-
ment rights for public morality. In contrast, although the Japanese Court also uses a balancing test in 
applying the constitutional standard of obscenity, the Court gives greater deference to the government 
interest in maintaining public morality. 
78. Kim, Constitutim and Obscenity, supra note 63, at 269-70. 
79. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 27. 
80. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). 
81. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 25. 
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for the public morality; hence, a state's discretion to regulate IS limited to 
"hard-core sexual conduct."R2 
C. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
The Supreme Courts of both the United States and Japan have considered the 
question of whether capital punishment violates their respective Constitutions. 
This area is good for comparison because several significant points of agree-
ment and disagreement exist between the courts and the citizens of both nations. 
1. American Approach 
In 1972, the California Supreme Court held that the death penalty violated 
the state constitutional provision proscribing "cruel or unusual punishment."83 
In the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia 84 also held the 
death penalty to be unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court decision was 
limited to the particular fact situation in Furman. The Court held specifically that 
where a state convicts a black defendant in state court of murder or rape after a 
trial in which state law gives the jury absolute discretion to impose the death 
penalty, the imposition of the death sentence could constitute "cruel and unusual 
punishment" in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Due 
primarily to the absence of agreement among the justices in the Furman case, the 
questions if and under what circumstances the death penalty could be constitu-
tionally imposed were unclear. 85 
82. This line of court decisions primarily follows the Miller mandate. See People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 
149,544 P.2d 372 (1976); State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W. 2d 652 (Iowa 1973); State v. Shreveport News 
Agency, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464 (La. 1973); Commonwealth v. Horton, 365 Mass. 164, 310 N .E. 2d 316 
(1974); People v. Bloss, 394 Mich. 79, 288 N.W. 2d 384 (1975); ABC Interstate Theatres, Inc. v. State, 
325 So.2d 123 (Miss. 1976); McCright v. Olson, 367 F. Supp. 937 (D.N.D. 1973). Commonwealth v. 
MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 347 A.2d 290 (1975). 
83. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, eert. den., 406 U.S. 958 (1972). The Constitu-
tion of the State of California reads in part: "Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted." CAL. 
CONSTIT. art. I, § 17. 
The concept of "cruel and unusual punishment" is not susceptible to precise definition. In a recent 
decision, a California Superior Court judge ruled that overcrowding and understaffing of the San 
Diego County jail constituted "cruel & unusual punishment" and ordered the county to make changes. 
San Diego Union, May 13, 1980, at 1, col. 3. 
84. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
85. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, stated that the death penalty was "unusual" if, in its 
application, the state discriminated against the defendant by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social 
position, or class. Douglas further stated that if the state imposed the death penalty under a procedure 
which left room for selective application of the penalty to minorities, the punishment was "cruel and 
unusual." [d. at 240-57. According to Justice Douglas: 
There is evidence that the provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the 
language of the 8th Amendment was taken, was concerned primarily with selective or irregular 
application of harsh penalties and that its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory 
penalties of a severe nature." Id. at 242 (quoting Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unu5ual Punishment 
Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). 
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However, in the 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia,86 the Supreme Court held that 
the imposition of the death penalty did not, in all circumstances, constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment. The plurality opinion pointed out that although 
contemporary values concerning a challenged punishment are relevant to the 
applicability of the eighth amendment, public perceptions of standards of de-
cency with respect to criminal punishment are not conclusive, and a penalty must 
accord with the "general dignity of man."87 According to the Court, since an 
assessment of contemporary standards was an important component of the 
constitutional test, the legislative judgment weighed heavily in ascertaining such 
standards. Further. the Court noted that it would presume a punishment im-
posed by a legislature to be valid. 
History and precedent, according to the Court, supported the conclusion that 
the death penalty imposed for the crime of murder was not a per se violation of 
the eighth or the fourteenth amendments. Also, the Supreme Court had long 
recognized that capital punishment was not invalid per se. As the plurality 
pointed out, a large segment of society regarded capital punishment as an 
appropriate criminal sanction. For example, in response to the 1972 Furman 
decision, legislatures in 35 states enacted new statutes providing the death 
penalty for at least some crimes.88 
The plurality further noted that evidence indicated that the death penalty was 
a significant deterrent to crime, and that a state legislature was not clearly wrong 
in determining that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases. Finally, 
the Court stated that the death penalty was not invariably disproportionate to the 
crime of murder.89 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that courts should not judge 
the legality of punishments by inflexible absolute standards. The Court measures 
punishments against the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society."90 In this regard, Justice Brennan has said that the 
government, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens with respect for their 
intrinsic worth as human beings. Therefore, punishments are cruel and unusual 
if they "do not comport with human dignity."91 In this regard, pain may be a 
factor in the judgment of whether a punishment is cruel. Although the govern-
86. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
87. !d. at 173. 
88. [d. at 179. 
89. [d. at 180. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions upheld the rule in Gregg v. Georgia. See Profitt 
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 325 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). For information on prisoners sentenced to 
death in 1978, on executions carried out from 1930 to 1978, and on trends in the evolution of capital 
punishment laws over the past 10 years, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1978 (1979). 
See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 1979 (1980). 
90. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957); see also Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1909). 
91. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 270. 
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ment may impose no physical mistreatment or primitive torture, severe mental 
pain may be inherent in the infliction of a particular punishment. However, this 
mental pain would not necessarily invalidate the punishment.92 
According to the Court, a punishment may be degrading and, therefore, 
proscribed, simply because of its enormity. For example, the Court considers 
expatriation more primitive than torture because expatriation necessarily in-
volves a "denial by society of the individual's existence as a member of the human 
community."93 The Court will consider the infliction of a severe punishment to 
be cruel if the punishment is different from what society generally does under 
the circumstances. 94 In addition, punishments may not be excessive with point-
less infliction of suffering. The punishment's excessive length, severity or dis-
proportion to the crime committed characterizes this extreme. 95 
Students may be interested in discussing Supreme. Court cases dealing spe-
cifically with permissible methods of execution. In In re Kemmler,96 an early U.S. 
Supreme Court case, the Court noted that although the punishment of death is 
not cruel if weighed within the meaning of the Constitution, punishments 
involving torture or lingering death are cruel. The concept of cruelty, in the 
Court's reasoning, implies something barbarous in addition to the mere extin-
guishment of life. The Court rejected the contention that the infliction of death 
by means of electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In so 
doing, the Court noted that the state passed its legislation authorizing electrocu-
tion in an effort to devise a more humane method of execution. 97 Although 
electrocution as a method of execution was "unusual" because of its novelty at 
the time, the Court did not consider it cruel on that basis alone. The Court did 
indicate that punishment, such as burning at the stake, crucifixion, and breaking 
on the wheel were manifestly cruel and unusual.98 
Similarly, in Wilkerson v. Utah,99 the Supreme Court held that the use of firing 
squads as a mode of administering the death penalty for first degree murder was 
not a cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amend-
ment. The Court, in focusing on methods of execution that would be constitu-
tionally impermissible, indicated that the eighth amendment forbids punishments 
of torture, such as those in which the executioner drags the prisoner to the place 
of execution, disembowels the prisoner alive, or beheads, or draws and quarters 
the prisoner. loo In Francis v. ResUleber,t°l the Supreme Court stated. however. 
92. [d. at 271. 
93. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. al 101. 
94. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 276. 
95. [d. at 279. 
96. 136 U.S. 436 (1889). 
97. [d. at 443. 
98. Id:. at 446. 
99. 99 U.S. 130 (1879). 
100. [d. at 135. 
101. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
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that any unavoidable suffering inherent in the method of extinguishing life did 
not alone make a punishment "cruel" within the meaning of the eighth amend-
ment. 102 
2. Japanese Approach 
In Ichikawa et al v. japan, loa the Japanese Supreme Court considered the 
validity of the death penalty in light of Article 36 of the Japanese Constitution. 
Article 36 states: "The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel 
punishments are absolutely forbidden." 
In Ichikawa, the trial court sentenced the defendant, a convicted murderer, to 
death by hanging. The primary issue in the case was the validity of Cabinet 
Order No. 65 of February 20, 1873,104 which specified hanging as a manner of 
imposing the death penalty. The Japanese Supreme Court, following a previous 
ruling, lOS held that the 1873 Cabinet Order did not lose its force after the 
adoption of the new Constitution in 1947 and that it retained its effectiveness as 
law. Therefore, according to the Court, only future action by the legislature 
could change or abolish those portions of the Order pertaining to the method of 
implementing the death sentence. In the absence of such legislation, the Court 
held, neither hanging nor the death penalty itself contravened the Article 36 
proscription of cruel punishments. 
Ichikawa also raised the issue that japan's Criminal Code,106 the Code of 
Criminal Procedure l07 and the Prison Law Enforcement Regulations,los which 
provide for capital punishment and authorize persons to order the imposition of 
the death penalty, failed to specify the manner of imposing the punishment. 
102. [d. at 464. See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982), in which the Court struck down 
the death penalty imposed on a youthful murderer in Oklahoma. The Court warned trial judges to 
weigh the backgrounds of defendants under age 18 before sentencing them in capital cases. 
justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that the defendant, who was 16 when he killed an 
Oklahoma highway patrolman, had grown up in a broken home without supervision, had been beaten 
by his father and had a retarded mental and emotional development. The Court remanded the case to 
the state court for a new sentencing hearing. [d. 
Although the 5-4 ruling was very limited in scope, making no new law and avoiding the issue of 
whether the execution of juveniles violates the eighth amendment, the decision was notable for two 
reasons. First, according to the majority, in deciding whether to sentence a murderer to death, a court 
must consider the disturbed mental and emotional development of a defendant who is under 18 at the 
time of the offense. Second, a solid minority of four justices stated in their dissent that they do not 
believe that the eighth amendment prohibits the sentencing of a juvenile to death. [d. 
103. This case is discussed in iTOH & BEER, supra note 36, at 161-64. 
104. Saiko saiban-sho. jima so-kyoku. For a translation of this Cabinet Order see SUPREME COURT OF 
JAPAN (1873). 
105. Decision of Apr. 6, 1955, 9 Sai-han Keishii 663 (Grand Bench). 
106. Keiha (Penal Code) Law No. 45 of 1907. 
107. Keiji sosha ha (Code of Criminal Procedure) Law No. 131 of 1948 [KEIJI sosHa Hal. 
lOS. Kangoku ha shiko risoku (Ministry of justice Order) No. IS of 1905. 
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Thus, the defense contended that the method of implementing the death pen-
alty may, in some circumstances, violate the provisions of the Cabinet Order and 
would, therefore, contravene Article 31 of the Constitution. Article 31 of the 
Japanese Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, 
nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure 
established by law." The Court ruled that, because it found no specific violation 
concerning the basic details as prescribed in the Order, the mere possibility of 
nonconformity to the Order's provisions would not alone invalidate the 
authorized method of administering capital punishment based on Article 31 of 
the Constitution. 
In another murder case!09 the Japanese Supreme Court stated that the state 
can inflict a punishment depriving an individual of his life under appropriate 
procedures established by law. The Court considered the threat of the death 
penalty to be a general preventive measure and the implementation of the 
penalty to be a means of protecting society from evil. In approving the death 
penalty, the Court reasoned that its decision gives supremacy to the concept of 
humanity as a whole rather than to the concept of humanity as individuals. The 
Court reasoned that the continuation of the death penalty is necessary for the 
public welfare. 
The Court also noted that capital punishment is cruel when the humanitarian 
point of view generally recognizes the method of implementing it as cruel. 
Examples of such cruel methods include burning at the stake, crucifixion, boiling 
and impaling. 
Although the Japanese Supreme Court decision in Ichikawa firmly established 
that neither the death penalty per se nor the death penalty by hanging violate the 
Japanese Constitution's prohibition against "cruel punishments," the capital 
punishment issue has been a prominent subject of public debate in Japan. 
However, one focus of the capital punishment debate has been slightly different 
than the debate in the United States. 
A proposal, known as the system of postponed execution of the death penalty, 
has emerged from the public controversy. An examination of the proposal's 
genesis and content adds to an understanding of the Japanese attitudes on 
capital punishment and sharpens the comparison with the American position. 
The 1961 draft of the Japanese Penal Code,110 prepared by the Japanese 
Legal System Deliberation Council,l11 contained Article 34 which stated: "1. The 
109. Decision of Mar. 12, 1948. Hanreishii, II, No.3, 191 (Criminal) (Grand Bench). This case is 
discussed in MAKI, supra note 36, at 156. 
110. Kaisei Keihii jumbisiian (The 1961 Preliminary Draft of a Revised Penal Code, Ministry of 
Justice, A Preparatory Draft for the Revised Penal Code of Japan 1961) (Tokyo, 1963). 
Ill. For an explanation of the role of the Council and the Japanese efforts to revise the Penal Code, 
see Kim, Asian Criminal Law: A Comparison with Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 14 S. TEX. LAW J. 43,48-50 
(1973). 
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death penalty shall be inflicted by hanging. 2. A person sentenced to death shall 
be incarcerated in a penal institution until his execution."112 
Under this provision, the court, in imposing the death penalty, may postpone 
execution of the sentence for five years, if the court considers that the circum-
stances warrant such a postponement. 113 Although the committee rejected 
the proposed system of postponed execution of the death penalty, 114 both sides 
developed extensive arguments on the issue. 
Advocates of the establishment of the system of postponed execution of the 
death penalty argued that legal drafters should carefully consider the humanita-
rian world trend to abolish or at least limit the use of the death penalty. Second, 
the advocates argued that in some cases the motive behind the criminal act, the 
mental status of the offender, the offender's attitude after committing the crime, 
and the low degree of potential danger to society posed by the offender did not 
warrant the death penalty. Third, proponents asserted that by prescribing the 
death penalty in the Code, and by delegating discretionary power to judges, the 
law could maximize the deterrent effect of the death penalty. The advocates of 
the system also argued that another check on the imposition of the death penalty 
would not not decrease its deterrent effect since clemency was rarely extended to 
those offenders receiving the death penalty. Finally, they noted that the public 
had begun to favor the system. 
112. DRAFT PENAL CODE, supra note 60, at 30-31. 
I 13. These two proposed provisions drew criticism from legal drafters who advocated the abolition 
of the death penalty. The Council's Special Committee on Criminal Law adopted the two provisions 
proposed by the 1961 draft, taking into consideration the national sentiment and the level of criminal 
activity. Suzuki, Dainizi Sankoanno Sakuseito Bukaishingi (pt. 1),489 jURISTO 117, 129 (1971). However, the 
Second Subcommittee, whose primary responsihility is handling questions related to punishment, took 
the position that even if the death penalty is to be maintained, the sentence and execution should be 
minimized. Thus, the subcommittee studied various means to achieve this goal including: placing a 
restriction on imposing the death penalty in cases involving murder; requiring a psychiatric test for 
defendants in death penalty cases; requiring the unanimous decision of judges imposing the death 
sentence; adopting the system of postponed execution or suspended execution of the death penalty; 
and utilizing clemency (with reduced sentences) in death penalty cases. Id. 
The proposal to adopt the system of postponed execution or suspended execution of the death 
penalty became the subject of serious discussion by the subcommittee. From this discussion, the 
subcommittee prepared a draft proposal to promote this system for the Special Committee on Criminal 
Law. The proposal consisted of three measures. First, when imposing the death penalty, the court can 
render a sentence with the postponed execution of the death penalty for five years if the court can 
recognize the cinumstances which would warrant the reservation of the execution of this penalty, 
taking into consideration the objective of punishment. Under this approach a person whose execution 
of the death penalty is postponed would be detained in a penal institution to receive correctional 
treatments. 
Second, when the period of postponed execution of the death penalty expires, the court, upon receipt 
of opinions of the Deliberation Committee on Death Penalty, can convert the death penalty to life 
imprisonment or confinement unless a need for the execution of the death penalty exists. Id. 
Third, any offender whose death penalty is reduced to life imprisonment is not entitled to ask for a 
parole until after the expiration of 20 years from the date of the imposition of the death penalty. Id. 
114. Suzuki, Dainizi Sankoanno Sakuseito Bukaishingi (pt. 2), 489 jURISTO 1 17, 118-9 (1971). 
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According to opponents of the postponed execution system, courts were 
already cautious in rendering death sentences; therefore, sound reasons usually 
existed for imposing the death sentence. Opponents also claimed that adoption 
of the system would substantially decrease the deterrent power of the death 
penalty. They asserted that limited application of the death penalty could be as 
effectively achieved through the actual trial practice of judges and attorneys. 
Opponents finally argued that the creation of a five-year waiting period was 
more psychologically inhumane than immediate execution. 
3. Comparative Analysis 
The approaches of both the Japanese and the U.S. Supreme Court to capital 
punishment have much in common. In fact, the Japanese and U.S. decisions 
contain more similarities than differences. Both Courts have acknowledged that 
their respective constitutional framers accepted capital punishment. The courts 
of both nations also have consistently recognized that capital punishment, par-
ticularly for the crime of murder, is not invalid per se nor is it invariably 
disproportionate to the crime. Similarly, the Supreme Courts of both nations 
adhere to the principle that although a legislature may not impose excessive 
punishments, it need not choose the least severe penalty possible. In both coun-
tries a heavy burden rests upon those challenging the judgment of the legisla-
ture. Further, according to both Supreme Courts, retribution and the possible 
deterrent factor of capital punishment is a permissible factor for the legislatures 
to consider in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. 
The Japanese Supreme Court, like the U.S. Supreme Court, has indicated that 
it will consider evolving societal attitudes and standards in considering the 
validity of capital punishment in the future. On this issue, however, the two 
Courts have differed in their approaches. As in obscenity cases, the Japanese 
Supreme Court tends to act as the glIardian of the public welfare in cases 
involving the death penalty. Further, the Court generally holds the rights of 
society prior to those of the individual. The Japanese Supreme Court is not 
averse to using its own perception of evolving societal standards, rather than that 
of the legislature or the general public. 
The U.S. Supreme Court also considers the public welfare. But, in contrast to 
the Japanese, the Court is primarily concerned with the rights of the individual. 
This concern for the rights of the individual is indicated by the Court's focus, "in 
both Furman and Gregg, on the dangers of allowing the death penalty to be 
arbitrarily imposed by juries who may selectively impose the death sentence. U.S. 
legislatures and courts have not specifically focused on the concept of postponed 
execution of the death penalty. However, the delays inherent in the American 
appeals process make immediate execution of convicted individuals impossible 
in any event. 
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D. "Right" to Education Cases 
1. American Approach 
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly contain a right to education. In San 
/l,ntonio School District v. Rodriguez, 115 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that the Constitution implies such a fundamental right to education. The 
Court ruled that state statutes which regulate education are constitutional as long 
as they bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental objective. At issue in 
Rodriguez was the validity of school funding based on property taxes, a system 
which permitted a wide variance in the quality of education between districts. 
The Court held that this particular method of school funding was rationally 
related to the legitimate governmental goal of providing a minimum educa-
tion. IIB 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected any argument that 
education is either explicitly or implicitly a constitutionally guaranteed right, 
individual states have retained relatively unfettered control over this aspect of 
school policy. California, in exercising its control, for example, has abolished the 
collection of textbook fees. A California statute explicitly provides that: "[n]o 
school official shall require any pupil ... to purchase any instructional mate-
rial for the pupil's use in the school."117 Other state legislatures have also passed 
laws on this issue which have been upheld by both their state courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court." 8 The trend among states is to prohibit the collection of fees 
for mandatory textbooks. 
2. Japanese Approach 
In Kato v. japan, 119 the Japanese Supreme Court confronted the issue of the 
constitutionality of charging fees for textbooks in a compulsory education sys-
tem. Article 26 of the Japanese Constitution provides: 
115. 411 U.S. I (1973). 
116. [d. 
117. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60070 (West 1978). 
118. The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that the State's constitutional mandate of "free" public 
schools did not require the legislature to provide free textbooks; a textbook rental fee was therefore 
permissible. Chandler v. South Bend Community School Corp., 160 Ind. App. 592, 312 N.E.2d 915 
(1974). The Supreme Court of New Mexico ruled that the state constitutional provision requiring "free" 
public schools prohibited imposition of textbook fees for required courses, but did not prevent exaction 
of fees for elective courses. Norton v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 16,89 N.M. 470, 553 P.2d 
1277 (1976). The Montana Supreme Court ruled that, although fees could not be charged for 
textbooks. reasonable fees were valid if charged for an activity unrelated to a recognized academic or 
educational goal of the school. Granger v. Cascade County School Dist., 159 Mt. 516, 499 P.2d 780 
(1972). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed an Arizona court ruling upholding the imposition 
of textbook fees and the failure to provide free textbooks for indigents. Carpio v. Tucson High School 
Dist. No.1 of Pima County, III Ariz. 127,524 P.2d 948 (1974), cert. den., 420 U.S. 982 (1974). 
119. This case is cited and discussed in ITOH & BEER, supra note 36, at 147-9. 
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All people shall have the right to receive an equal education, corre-
spondent to their ability, as provided by law. All people shall be 
obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive 
ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory educa-
tion shall be free. 
117 
The guardian of a public elementary school pupil sued the government for 
reimbursement of textbook fees, arguing that since Article 26 requires the state 
to provide a free, compulsory education system, the government should pay for 
all necessary textbooks during compulsory years of education. 120 
The Japanese Supreme Court found that the Article 26 guarantee of equal 
educational rights and a "free" minimum compulsory education up through 
grade nine did not require the state to bear all educational expenses. The Court 
reasoned that because education is necessary for a child's maturation and charac-
ter development, a child's guardian has a constitutionally-imposed obligation to 
educate his children. Due to this dual obligation on the part of the state and the 
guardian, expecting the state to assume all educational expenses would be 
unreasonable. According to the Court, the term "free," as used in Article 26 
refers only to tuition for compulsory education. 121 The Court concluded that the 
issue of textbook purchase fees is a matter of legislative concern. 
3. Comparative Analysis 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Japanese Constitution explicitly grants its 
citizens the right to a free, equal education up to a specified minimum level. 
Although no state in the United States is obligated to provide its citizens with a 
minimum education, states have individually undertaken to provide a free, 
public education up to a certain grade level. In fact, the majority of states require 
youths to attend school until they reach a designated age. 
Like the Court in Kato v. Japan, which decided that the Japanese Constitution 
does not require the state to bear all non-tuition costs necessary for even compul-
sory education, various state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld the 
collection of textbook fees for required courses. 122 However, the Court in Kato 
did suggest that the state, via legislation, should attempt to lessen the financial 
burden borne by parents and guardians of school children. The U.S. Supreme 
Court similarly has allowed state legislatures to regulate almost all aspects of 
education, including the collection of textbook fees, as long as statutes are 
"rationally related" to the legitimate objective of providing a minimum educa-
120.Id. 
121. Fundamental Law of Education, Law No. 25 of Mar. 31, 1947, art. 4 & 6; Proviso of the School 
Education Law, Law No. 25 of Mar. 31, 1947 (both of which prohibit charging of tuition) reprinted in 
1TOH & BEER, supra note 36, at 148. 
122. See note 118 supra. 
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tion. Although constitutionally permitted to charge for instructional materials 
related to compulsory courses in public schools, many states in the United States 
have followed the trend to prohibit the collection of such fees. 123 
E. Contested Election Cases 
1. American Approach 
In the United States, the federal Constitution, as well as various state constitu-
tions, provides that "each house shall be the judge of the election, returns and 
qualifications of its own members."124 Thus, in the event of an election contest, 
only the legislature may determine whether its procedures have been regularly 
followed.125 Federal and state courts have held consistently that the courts have 
no jurisdiction in this area. 126 The courts have invoked the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers by asserting either the political question doctrine or the abstention 
doctrine. 127 
The case of Bond v. Floyd 128 brought a challenge to the legislature's exclusive 
power to judge its own members' qualifications for office. For the first time, a 
court assumed jurisdiction to determine the qualifications of a member-elect of a 
legislative body, notwithstanding a constitutional grant of authority to the legisla-
ture. 
The Georgia House of Representatives deprived Julian Bond, a duly elected 
member, of his seat based on the legislators' belief that, in light of Bond's 
criticism of U.S. policies in Vietnam and the Selective Service laws, Bond could 
not properly uphold the oath of office as required by the Georgia constitution. 
Bond sought injunctive relief, claiming that his exclusion from the House on the 
basis of his political statements infringed his right of free expression under the 
first amendment. Unanimously reversing the lower court decision, the Supreme 
Court held that Bond's exclusion was, in fact, a violation of his first amendment 
guarantee of freedom of speech. In so holding, the Court rejected the conten-
tion that a state could demand a stricter degree of loyalty from its elected officials 
than it could from ordinary citizens. The Court reasoned that a legislator must 
123.Id. 
124. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 5. 
125.Id. 
126. 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245, 247 (1967). The Constitution of the State of California, for instance, 
prescribes that: "Each house of the legislature must judge the qualifications and elections of its 
members." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (amended 1976). In a case involving a contest after a primary 
election of an assemblyman, the California Supreme Court held that the legislature cannot delegate its 
jurisdiction to the courts, either directly or indirectly, by authorizing the courts to decide election 
contests. Markwort v. McGee, 26 Cal. 2d 592, 226 P.2d I (1951). 
127. 17 L. Ed. 2d 911, 912 (1966). See notes 40-46 and accompanying text supra. 
128. 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
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be free to discuss major issues and IS entitled to the same constitutional protec-
tion afforded other citizens. 12 " 
2. Japanese Approach 
In Iwasaki 1'. Japan, l:lO the Japanese Supreme Court considered the issue of 
contested elections. In this case, an Assemblyman's campaign manager was 
convicted of violating the Public Office Election Law which prohibited bribery in 
connection with elections. 131 Two voters in Iwasaki's voting district challenged 
the validity of Iwasaki's election to the Assembly arguing that conviction of a 
candidate's campaign manager for violating the Election Law invalidated the 
election. The lower court agreed and voided the election. On appeal to the 
Japanese Supreme Court, Iwasaki contended that Articles 2 I 1132 and 25 I _a 133 of 
129. For a discussion of the Bond case . .In Finegold, Julian Bond and the First Amendment Balance, 29 
U. PITT. L. REV. 167 (1967). 
Jd. 
130. This case is discussed in ITOH & BaR. supra note 36. at 150. 
131. Law No. 100 of April 15. 19,')0. 
132. Article 211 of the Public Office Election Law provides: 
1. Electors or candidates may initiate a suit against a successful candidate for a public office 
within thirty days from the election at a High Court, seeking a court decision to invalidate the 
latter's victorY on grounds of Article 251-2. paragraph I (disqualification of a successful 
candidate due to an election law violation by his manager or treasurer, when an election 
campaign manager or treasurer of the successful candidate has been convicted of having 
committed a crime under Article 221 (bribery and inducement for special interests); Article 
222 (bribing for the interests of a plurality of people); Article 223 (bribing for the interests of 
candidates, both successful and unsuccessful); or Article 223-2 (an unlawful use of newspapers 
and magazines). 
2. Electors or candidates may initiate a suit against a successful candidate for a public office 
within thirty days from the election at a High Court, seeking a court decision to invalidate his 
victory on grounds of provisions of Article 251-2, paragraph 2 (disqualification due to a 
violation by a campaign treasurer of the legally-fixed election expenditures, when a campaign 
treasurer has been convicted of the offense of spending in excess of the amount allowed by law. 
as stipulated in Article 247 herein. 
133. Article 251-2 of the Public Office Election Law provides: 
I. A successful candidate shall be disqualified when his election manager or treasu rer has been 
indicted and convicted of having committed a crime under Article 221 (bribery and induce-
ment for special interests); Article 222 (bribing for the interests of a plurality of people); 
Artide 223 (bribing f(,r the interests of candidates, both successful and unsuccessful); or 
Article 223-2 (an unlawful use of newspapers and magazines). But in case an act falls under the 
provisions of anyone of the items below, it will be decided otherwise, as long as the alleged 
offense is concerned. 
(1) vVhen a person other than an election campaign manager or treasurer instigates acts 
stipulated herein with the intention of defeating his own candidate in collaboration with an 
opposing candidate or his campaign workers. 
(2) "Vhen the manager or treasurer commits the crime stipulated herein in collaboration 
with opposing candidates or their campaign workers with the objective of defeating the 
opponent(s). 
2. A successful candidate shall be disqualified when his campaign treasurer is charged and 
convicted with violating Article 247 (the lawful limit of campaign expenditures). The proviso in 
the preceding paragraph shall be applicable hereto. 
fd. 
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the Public Office Election Law violated Articles 13,134 15 135 and 31'36 of the 
Japanese Constitution. 
Iwasaki raised the constitutional issue of whether the election statutes violated 
Article 13's provision that "all people shall be respected as individuals." Iwasaki 
argued that invalidating his election based on the actions of another party 
unconstitutionally held him accountable for the acts of others and amounted to 
imposing guilt by association. Iwasaki also argued that the application of Sec-
tion 251-2 of the Public Office Election Law contravened the intent and spirit of 
Article 15 of the Constitution, which allowed voters to choose their candidates 
free from governmental interference. Finally, Iwasaki argued that Section 251-2 
of the election statute violated his right to due process of law under Article 31 of 
the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court dismissed Iwasaki's appeal reasoning that the revision of 
the Public Office Election Law, as effected by Law 207 of December 1954,137 
strengthened the election law provision concerning guilt by association by requir-
ing a successful candidate to have paid proper attention to the selection and 
supervision of his election campaign manager. The Court rejected Iwasaki's 
constitutional arguments on the grounds that the public interest outweighed the 
individual's interest. The Court explained that the intention behind the 
strengthened regulations concerning guilt by association was to insure a fair 
election of public officials by a free expression of voters' decisions. The Court 
reasoned that since a manager in an election campaign acts as a principal 
promoter for a given candidate and exercises supervisory authority over every 
aspect of the election, a manager who had violated the provisions of Article 
251-2 of the Public Office Election Law woulcl probably affect not only the 
election of his candidate, but also the free nature of the votes cast for the 
particular candidate. Therefore, according to the Court, since such an election 
134. Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "All of the people shall be respected as 
individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not 
interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental 
affairs." MAKI, supra note 36, at 413. 
135. Article 15 of the Japanese Constitution reads: 
The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them. 
2. All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof. 
3. Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials. 
4. In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, 
publicly or privately, for the choice he has made. 
MAKI, supra note 36, at 414. 
136. Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived oflife or liberty, 
nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law." 
MAKI, supra note 36, at 415. 
137. For a translation and discussion of this Law, see ITOH & BEER, supra note 36, at 152-53. 
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would not have been fair, nullifying the candidate's victory would conform to the 
spirit of the election system, even if the candidate had not been negligent in 
selecting and supervising his campaign manager. 138 
3. Comparative Analysis 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Japanese approach in dealing 
with contested election proceedings contrasts sharply with the U.S. approach. 
The Iwasaki case indicates that the Japanese judiciary may invalidate election 
returns involving a member of the national or prefectural legislatures if either 
the candidate or one of his close advisors committed any substantial illegal act. 
Furthermore, where a candidate's manager or treasurer has violated the Election 
Code, the courts may hold the candidate himself accountable through the elec-
tion invalidation proceeding, regardless of any personal knowledge, guilt or 
negligence by the candidate. 
In contrast, the U.S. Constitution mandates the non-involvement of the courts 
in determining the manner of holding elections, 139 judging returns, or assessing 
the qualifications of members of legislatures - a function committed to the 
legislature. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bond created an exception to 
the general rule where the procedural standards used by the legislature for 
determining qualifications of its members have the effect of impinging on 
individual constitutional rights. 
F. Religious Freedom Cases 
1. American Approach 
In cases dealing with the issue of freedom of religion, the courts in the United 
States have promulgated a balancing test, weighing the state's interest in main-
taining a well ordered society against the freedom of the individual to act in 
accordance with the dictates of his religion. Some of the earliest and strictest 
American cases allowing constraints on religious beliefs in the face of a compel-
ling state interest in maintaining public health and safety, were the snake-
handling cases. 140 After the courts affirmed the validity of state restrictions 
138. Id. at 153. 
139. Article I, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides: "The times, places and manner of holding 
elections, for senators and representatives. shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof: 
But the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of 
choosing senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
140. Hill v. State, 38 Ala. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956), cert. den. 264 Ala. 697, 88 So. 2d 887 (1956). 
The snake-handling cases involved Christian Fundamentalists who believed that Jesus commanded 
them to handle poisonous snakes in order to strengthen the faith of others. Snake handling is central to 
their religion, as they believe that if their faith is strong enough, they will not be bitten, or if they are 
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on snake handling, at least one state went so far as to enact a statute forbidding 
the handling of snakes altogether. 141 
Although a few snake-handling cults still exist, the cases on this subject illus-
trate the willingness of the government to interfere with the practice of religion 
when the government perceives a real threat to public safety. State statutes 
prohibiting the handling of snakes, though clearly aimed at the snake cultists, 
have continued to withstand constitutional challenges. 142 
The rulings in the snake-handling cases, however, are exceptions to the Amer-
ican courts' handling of religion cases. Courts in the United States generally 
favor a policy of judicial restraint where the individual demonstrates a bona fide 
religious belief. For example, the courts will impose no legal sanction against 
faith healers who counsel people to refrain from medical treatment, even where 
the believer follows the advice and consequently dies. In effect, an adult may 
freely make religious choices concerning his own medical treatment.143 
In a similar vein, American courts have taken the position that the state may 
regulate medical treatment. For example, diagnosis and treatment of a disease 
without a proper license can be either a misdemeanorl44 or a felony l45 in 
California. However, the California Code also specifically provides that: "noth-
ing in this chapter shall be construed so as to. . . regulate, prohibit, or apply to 
any kind of treatment by prayer nor interfere in any way with the practice of 
religion."146 The statute does not require a license to heal by prayer.147 An 
Arizona court has held that the Native American Church is exempt from the 
general licensing rule. The court ruled that the Native American Church may 
use the drug peyote in religious rituals without a medical license.14B 
bitten, they will suffer no ill effects. Between 1940 and 1955, when the snake-handling movement was at 
its height, at least 16 persons died from snake bites received at snake-handling meetings. In fact, the 
founder of the cult died of a rattlesnake bite in 1955. See id.; Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 
708 (Tenn. 1948). 
141. For example. Tennessee law provides: "It shall be unlawful for a person, or persons, to display, 
exhibit, handle, or use any poisonous or dangerous snake or reptile in such a manner as to endanger the 
life or health of any person." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2208 (1955). 
142. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437,164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 
51 S.E.2d 179 (1949). 
143. This philosophy does not always apply to the decisions of parents concerning their children, 
where failure to provide medical treatment could subject the parent to charges of child neglect or 
manslaughter in the case of death. However, even in cases involving children, the court has occasionally 
been lenient. For example, in Commonwealth v. Sheridan, cited in L. WEINRELS, CRIMINAL LAw 179-83 
(1969), a Christian Scientist was convicted of manslaughter after her five year old daughter died from 
the complications of pneumonia. The court placed the mother on five years probation. !d. 
144. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2141 (West 1974). 
145. [d. § 2141.5. 
146. [d. § 2146. 
147. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2863,2884 (West 1974). 
148. State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973). 
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2. Japanese Approach 
Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees freedom of religion to 
Japanese citizens. 149 However. as in the American system, this right is not 
absolute, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court case of Nishida v. Japan. 150 In 
Nishida, a mentally disturbed woman died while under the care of a priestess. 
The priestess, a member of a bona fide Buddhist sect, followed procedures 
prescribed by her religion to drive out an evil spirit, in an attempt to cure the 
woman. 151 The priestess performed the procedure at the request of the woman's 
family, who had lost faith in her family physician. 
A lower court convicted the priestess of inflicting injury resulting in death. 
The priestess appealed her conviction on the ground that she had had no 
criminal intent and had inflicted no bodily harm on the deceased. The priestess 
further argued that the lower court had exhibited a religious bias by calling her 
sincere religious beliefs and practices, superstitious and ignorant. 
The Japanese Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling on the basis of 
Articles 12152 and 13153 of the Constitution, which proscribe any infringement 
on fundamental human rights, as long as the exercise of those rights does not 
interfere with the public welfare. With regard to Articles 12 and 13, the Court 
stated: 
Even if ... the acts of the accused in this case were ... a kind of 
religious act, they correspond to unlawful exercise of physical force 
endangering the life and limb of another person. Accordingly, the 
acts of the accused undeniably ended in the death of the victim and 
were seriously inimical to society.154 
The Court concluded that the acts of the priestess exceeded the boundaries of 
[d. 
149. MAKI. supra note 36. at 414: 
Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution provides: (1) Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. 
No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State nor exercise any political 
authority. (2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious acts. celebration rite or 
practice. (3) The state and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other 
religious activity. The First Amendment of the Gnited States Constitution reads: Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof. 
150. Decision of May 15, 1963. 17 Sai-han Keishu 4 (Grand Bench). 
151. The ritual consisted of chanting sutras, burning incense, and rubbing the woman's body with 
prayer beads. The woman was physically weak and the lack of necessary hospital treatment resulted in 
her death. [d. 
152. Article 12 of the Japanese Constitution provides: "The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the 
people by the Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain 
from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always he responsible filr utilizing them for the 
public welfare." MAKI, supra note 36, at 413. 
153. For the text of article 13, see note 134 supra. 
154. Decision of May 15. 1963, 17 Sai-han Keishu 4, at 303 (Grand Bench). 
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the freedom of religion guaranteed in Article 20, and that the punishment of 
those acts under Article 205 of the Criminal Code155 did not violate the Constitu-
tion. 
The Nishida holding demonstrates that in Japanese society freedom of religion 
is not absolute and must be balanced against the general effect of its exercise 
upon the public welfare. The Nishida Court also considered the issue of the 
regulation of religious-based medical treatment and stated that: "The manner, 
methods and motives in practicing this faith cure, attended by a degree of 
violence that ended in the victim's loss of life ... cannot possibly be recognized 
as acts of medical treatment for persons with medical disorders generally ac-
cepted in medical practice."156 
3. Comparative Analysis 
The result in Nishida v. Japan would probably be different if the case were tried 
under American case law principles. At the least, the priestess would suffer a 
lesser penalty, because she apparently demonstrated a bona fide religious belief. 
The trend in the United States has been toward a policy of judicial leniency 
where the court finds a sincere religious belief. The American approach protects 
against the danger that the emotional sentiments underlying personal religious 
beliefs will obscure the legal issues or permit encroachment on constitutional 
rights. As one American commentator reasoned: 
Those of us who belong to churches which are rich and respectable 
quite properly condemn the snake handlers, the floggers, the faith 
healers. But under a constitutional scheme which allows the state no 
religious favoritism, even these extremist groups must be as free to 
follow their conscience as the rest of us are. 157 
V. OTHER TOPIC SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPARISON 
The curriculum might also discuss the licensing of public gatherings in Japan 
and the United States. This discussion could include a comparison of Cox v. New 
Hampshire 158 and Niemotko v. Maryland,159 with the Tokyo Ordinance Decision160 
ISS. KEIHO (Penal Code) art. 205. This article provides: 
(I) A person, who inflicts an injury upon the person of another and thereby causes the latter's 
death, shall be punished with penal servitude for a limited period of not less than two years. (2) 
When the crime is committed against a lineal ascendant of the offender or of the spouse 
thereof, the offender shall be punished with penal servitude for the life or not less than three 
years. 
156. Decision of May 15, 1963, 17 Sai-han Keishu 4, at 303 (Grand Bench). 
157. Wright, Book Review, 38 MINN. L. REv. 87, 89-90 (1953). 
158. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
159. 340 U.S. 268 (1951). 
160. For a discussion of the Tokyo Ordinance decision,see CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 37, at 
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to determine American and Japanese constitutional standards for the issuance of 
licenses for public gatherings. Students will observe that, in the Tokyo Ordi-
nance Decision, the defendants had made no effort to obtain a license, but 
instead, had attacked the ordinance on its face. After reading Cox and Nierrwtko 
students should then analyze whether an American defendant would succeed in 
such an attack. 
Students might also examine the concept of property rights and due process of 
law in the United States and Japan through a comparison of the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 31 of the 
Japanese Constitution. The omission of the term "property" in the Japanese 
Constitution will be notable. In order to compare the rights of American citizens 
to "due process of law," with the rights of Japanese citizens to "procedure 
established by law," students should read the Customs Law Violation Decision. 161 
In that case, the Japanese Supreme Court held a statutory provision that 
required an innocent party to forfeit property used in smuggling to be un-
constitutional. Students should then consult the text, Constitutional Law, 162 to find 
analogous U.S. decisions. Comparing these cases, the student should analyze 
how the decisions differ when decided within the broader context of protection 
of property rights under the due process clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Past and present American involvement with Japan, China, Korea and Viet-
nam are concerns for the American people. An Asian law seminar contains the 
potential to heighten American law students' awareness that factors in foreign 
nations increasingly condition today's legal, as well as social problems. The 
author designed the seminar described in this article to engage in the challeng-
ing task of clarifying the meaning and characteristics of the East Asian legal 
culture, and of assessing the impact of civil and Anglo-American legal traditions 
on Asian nations. 
The suggested Japanese and American constitutional law cases provide Amer-
ican law students with a unique comparative approach. Although the constitu-
tional guarantees in both the United States and Japan appear to be similar in 
scope, they are significantly different in application. One cannot explain this 
difference in terms of the constitutional provisions, themselves, but must focus 
220-38; Nathanson, Human Rights in Japan Through the Looking-Glass of Supreme Court Decisions, II How. 
L. J. 316, 319 (1965); Nathanson, Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Assembly in Japan and the United 
States, 12 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 1032, 1042 (1963). 
161. For a discussion of the Customs Law Violation case, see CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 37, at 
248-49. 
162. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1969). 
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instead on the different cultural contexts in which those guarantees function. 
Japane,e culture stresses social interaction and inter-group duties and respon-
sibilities. In the enited States, individualism has provided the background for 
constitutional development and interpretation. Due to the recent proliferation 
of literature on Asian law,163 a successful undertaking of a seminar on Asian 
nations in a law school setting is no longer a difficult venture, but an attainable-
and practical - possibility. 
163. For a list of some of the relevant literature in this area, Sff note 22 supra. 
